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International criminal law as prosecuted in the various 
international tribunals focuses on mass atrocity crimes: 
(1) genocide; (2) crimes against humanity; and (3) war crimes.1 
As the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavian Tribunal has 
explained, “most of the time these crimes do not result from the 
criminal propensity of single individuals but constitute 
manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes often carried 
out by groups of individuals acting in pursuit of a common 
                                                 
* Professor, Vermont Law School.  
1. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998. arts. 
6–8, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (note that a definition of the Crime 
of Aggression has been adopted, but not implemented); Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991, arts. 2–5, U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex, (May 3, 1993), adopted by S.C. Res. 827, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, arts. 2–4, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/955, annex (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
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criminal design.”2 Despite the collective nature of these crimes, 
international criminal law has adopted a model of individual 
culpability.3 Some participants in a common criminal design or 
plan may physically perpetrate a criminal act; others act in ways 
that are vital to the commission of an offense. The principal task 
under international criminal law is to assess the culpability of 
each subgroup. This task requires fact gathering and sorting out 
the precise acts of individuals in the midst of mass atrocity.4 
While the definitions of international crimes may vary, the 
issues raised above also play out across the terrain of forms of 
participation.5 The responses of the international tribunals to 
these issues have been varied and inconsistent. This Article will 
consider the reasons why the doctrine regarding forms of 
participation for collective crimes is incoherent, the precise 
nature of the incoherence, and whether it is possible to 
reconcile the various approaches to individual responsibility in 
the context of collective criminality. It will conclude that while a 
certain measure of coherence may be attained, full 
                                                 
2. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 191 (Int’l Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/
acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf. 
3 . See 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL: NUREMBERG 14 NOVEMBER 1945 - 1 OCTOBER 1946, at 256 (1947) 
(stating that decisions must be rendered “in accordance with well-settled legal 
principles, one of the most important of which is that criminal guilt is personal, and 
that mass punishments should be avoided.”). For consideration of different models of 
criminal liability, see Andre Nollkaemper, Systemic Effects of International Responsibility for 
International Crimes, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 313 (2010) [hereinafter Drumbl, Systemic 
Effects]; Mark A. Drumbl, Accountability for System Criminality, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 
373 (2010) [Drumbl, Accountability for Systemic Criminality] (“International criminal law 
conceptually situates itself upon a fiction namely that wide-sale atrocity is the crime of 
individuals. Such it may be, but it also is much more.”); Mark A. Drumbl, Pluralizing 
International Criminal Justice, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1295 (2005) [Drumbl, Pluralizing 
International Criminal Justice]; George P. Fletcher, Collective Guilt and Collective 
Punishment, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 163 (2004). 
4. See generally MARK OSIEL, MAKING SENSE OF MASS ATROCITY (2009). 
5. These modes of responsibility are referred to in various ways. Professor Drumbl 
describes them as “culpability mechanisms” and indicates that “[e]xamples might 
include joint criminal enterprise, command responsibility, aiding and abetting; and 
also injecting greater elasticity into juridical understandings of ‘committing,’ 
‘instigating,’ ‘ordering,’ and both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect co-perpetration’.” Drumbl, 
Accountability for System Criminality, supra note 3, at 378 n.23. In this Article they will, in 
accordance with the literature, be variously referred to as modes/forms of 
responsibility, modes of liability, and forms of participation. 
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reconciliation of the various models will probably continue to 
elude the international criminal law. 
I. SOURCES OF THE INCOHERENCE 
There are many reasons for the failure of international 
criminal law to coalesce around one theoretical/doctrinal 
approach to crimes with multiple participants/perpetrators. 
A. Multiple Decision Making Regimes 
In 1993, the United Nations Security Council, acting in 
response to the ongoing armed conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, created the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”). 6  That ad hoc tribunal was 
established as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and 
charged under its founding statute with “prosecut[ing] . . . 
persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991.”7 This was the first international criminal 
tribunal since Nuremberg post-World War II. The ICTY statute 
was intended to be largely a codification of customary 
international law (“CIL”), its process a hybrid of civil and 
common law traditions. Prosecutors and judges from both 
traditions staffed the Tribunal.8 In 1994, the Security Council 
created, as a second subsidiary organ, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). In addition to these 
international tribunals, and in response to specific mass 
atrocities and armed conflicts, the international community 
established a series of so-called “hybrid” tribunals in Cambodia, 
Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Lebanon. 9  Each of these 
                                                 
6. S.C. Res. 808, ¶1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
7. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 1. 
8. See Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure 
in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 842–43 (2000); Patrick L. Robinson, 
Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 569, 574–79 (2000). 
9. See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003); 
Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal 
Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347 (2006); Frederic Megret, In Defense of 
Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of Criminal Justice, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 725 
(2005). 
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international and ad hoc tribunals functioned under its own 
founding document and while there are many similarities, there 
are also many differences in these documents.10 In 1998, a 
permanent international criminal court was established by treaty 
and came into being in 2002. The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court was a carefully negotiated 
agreement that drew upon civil and common law traditions both 
in terms of procedure and the substantive definitions of 
crimes. 11  Also, as with the ad hoc tribunals, judges and 
prosecutors represent both traditions. 
Finally, adding to the diffuse nature of decision making 
regarding international criminal law, domestic (national) courts 
and tribunals also prosecute international crimes. There is a 
long history of war crimes prosecutions at the national level. In 
the United States, for example, violators of the laws of war have 
long been tried in courts martial and military commissions.12 In 
recent years states have enacted or broadened the reach of 
domestic laws allowing prosecution for crimes against humanity 
and genocide, both in response to specific atrocities and the 
“complementarity” regime of the Rome Statute, under which 
the ICC defers to domestic investigations and prosecutions of 
international crimes. 13  The result is that multiple decision 
makers in different tribunals with differing charges are 
interpreting the same or similar international criminal law, 
including the law regarding forms of responsibility in collective 
crimes. 
                                                 
10. Compare ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 5 (defining crimes against humanity), 
with ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 3 (defining crimes against humanity); Rome 
Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (defining crimes against humanity). 
11. See THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of 
Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 443 
(1999). 
12. See, e.g., Scott Silliman, On Military Commissions, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 529 
(2005). 
13. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 1, 17; see Katherine L. Doherty & Timothy 
L.H. McCormack, “Complementarity” as a Catalyst for Comprehensive Domestic Penal 
Legislation, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L. L & POL’Y. 147 (1999); Michael P. Hatchell, Closing 
Gaps in United States Law and Implementing the Rome Statute: A Comparative Approach, 12 
ILSA J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 183 (2005). 
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B. Nature of International Criminal Law 
1. Strands of Law from which International Criminal Law is 
Derived 
Several factors add to the complexity of international 
criminal law, and therefore the difficulty in consistently applying 
it. First, international criminal law is a complex combination of 
various strands of law. 14  It derives most directly from 
International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) or the Law of War, 
which historically bounded states to conduct armed conflict 
within certain legal parameters, and defined as war crimes 
violations of those constraints.15 The Nuremberg Tribunal found 
that the extensive history of both treaty and the customary law of 
war also imposed international criminal responsibility on 
individuals.16 In addition to IHL, a second strand of law from 
which international criminal law derives is International Human 
Rights Law. 17  The law of Human Rights manifests itself in 
international criminal law in at least two ways. First, certain 
substantive crimes are derived from human rights precepts 
(particularly norms against discrimination). Crimes against 
humanity and the crime of genocide both fit this model.18 
Second, international human rights law provides a rich source of 
procedural protections for criminal defendants. Fundamental 
                                                 
14. This idea that various strands or threads of law have contributed to the 
development of international criminal law is one that has been explored elsewhere. See, 
e.g., Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005) (discussing “international criminal law as an outgrowth of 
three legal traditions: domestic criminal law, international human rights law, and 
transitional justice”).  
15. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
[hereinafter, collectively, Geneva Conventions]. 
16. See Opinion and Judgement, United States, et al. v. Goering, et al., (October 1, 
1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L LAW 172 (1947). 
17. For a discussion of the tension between “victim centered” human rights law 
and the “perpertrator centered” criminal law, see Danner & Martinez, supra note 14, at 
87. 
18. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 6, 7. 
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precepts such as nullum crimen sine lege (the presumption of 
innocence), prohibitions against double jeopardy, and various 
procedural protections at trial derive from well-established 
norms of international human rights law.19 A third strand of law 
from which international criminal law is derived is that of 
domestic law. 20  In both the development of customary 
international law and the drafting of treaties, those participating 
in the formulation of international criminal law necessarily 
bring to the table their own understanding of criminal law based 
upon their legal tradition. 
Several commentators have addressed the propriety of 
adopting norms of domestic criminal law either wholesale into 
international law or extrapolating from domestic law to derive 
international criminal law.21 This is an issue addressed later in 
this Article in the context of judicial interpretation of the Rome 
Statute.22 Given the differences in the nature of the crimes 
generally addressed by international and domestic regimes and 
the differing political, cultural and legal contexts in which such 
crimes are prosecuted, there are good arguments against 
assuming a domestic law approach will work at the international 
level.23 
                                                 
19. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976).   
20. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 14, at 83, for this discussion. 
21. See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: 
The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39 (2007) (“But application of the national law analogy proves 
particularly problematic for ICL because it strives to combine the paradigms of two very 
different legal fields: (1) classical international law – a profoundly consensual body of 
law based on broadly shareable norms among nation-states and occupied mainly with 
their rights and duties inter se; and (2) national criminal law – a profoundly coercive 
body of law often understood to embody the most fundamental norms and values of a 
local community, generally that of a single nation-state (or political subdivision).”). 
22. See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. 
23. In addition to the threads identified above as contributing to the development 
of international criminal law, an argument has been made by Andre Nollkemper that 
the law of state responsibility is “better positioned to address systemic causes of 
international crimes.” See Andre Nollkaemper, Systemic Effects of International 
Responsibility for International Crimes, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 313, 314 (2010). But see 
Allen S. Weiner, Working the System: A Comment on André Nollkaemper’s System Criminality 
in International Law, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 353 (2010); Julian Ku, How System 
Criminality Could Exacerbate the Weaknesses of International Criminal Law, 8 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L L. 365 (2010). 
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2. Incompatibility of International Criminal Law with the 
Traditional Emergence of CIL 
Traditionally, customary international law norms are 
formed by states generally and consistently engaging in a 
uniform practice with the understanding that they are legally 
obliged to do so.  This sense of legal obligation is referred to as 
opinio juris.24 This norm creation can take place over a long 
period of time or a very short period of time, as in the case of so-
called “instant” CIL,25 but the understanding is that at some 
moment in time the general practice and opinio juris will 
coalesce into a binding norm. This indeterminate and rather 
vague process contrasts with, or is at least in tension with, 
accepted tenets of international criminal law, which require 
clarity and precision in defining crimes, which require that the 
benefit of any doubt regarding that definition be given to the 
defendant, and which prohibit ex post facto criminal liability 
under the nullum crimen sine lege rule.26 This tension is most 
recently apparent in the decision of the Cambodian Tribunal 
regarding what CIL was established in the 1970s for purposes of 
prosecutions currently taking place.27 
3. Assessing Degree of Culpability 
While one may be able to tease out of all major legal 
systems a general rule that those who are more culpable should 
be convicted and punished for the most serious crimes, the 
actual process by which culpability is determined varies greatly 
                                                 
24. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. & Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 
(Feb. 20) (“Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of 
itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis 
of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would 
be that within the period in question, short thought it might be, State practice, 
including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both 
extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;—and should 
moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of 
law or legal obligation is involved.”). 
25 . See generally Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated 
Formation of Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 439 (2010). 
26. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22. 
27. See infra notes 119–142 and accompanying text. 
2014] COLLECTIVE CRIMINALITY 509 
from system to system.28  This is especially true in assessing 
individual responsibility for collective crimes, that is, crimes with 
multiple perpetrators. This determination of culpability turns on 
the characterization of principals versus accomplices, on the 
nature of complicity, on aiding and abetting, and on whether 
one is a co-perpetrator. It also turns on the weight to be 
accorded the actus reus versus the mens rea of the crime. The 
international tribunals that have considered these issues have 
emphasized different factors and hence have differing views of 
how to assess culpability and ultimately criminal responsibility. 
C. The Process of Interpretation 
Related to the first source of incoherence set out above, but 
sufficiently different to be discussed separately, is the fact that 
different tribunals have different ways of deciding upon and 
interpreting the law of their founding documents, which 
necessarily shapes the result reached. Even if the substantive 
definitions of the crimes are essentially the same, interpretation 
of the text may vary. For example, the ICTY is directed to 
consider CIL, while the ICC is directed to its own statutory 
language and only secondarily to CIL, and the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) and other 
hybrid courts are often directed to apply both international law 
and domestic law. This has proved to be a particular issue in 
defining modes of participation, which are often not expressly 
provided for in the founding documents.29 
                                                 
28 . See generally Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International 
Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International 
Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39 (2007). 
29. And, of course, to the extent that domestic courts are interpreting and 
applying international criminal law, they are doing so through a prism of national 
statutory and constitutional law accessed by judges who do not routinely deal with 
international law. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557, 604–11 (2006) (“Finally, 
international sources confirm that the crime charged here, is not a recognized 
violation of the law of war. As observed above . . . none of the major treaties governing 
the law of war identifies conspiracy as a violation thereof. And the only ‘conspiracy’ 
crimes that have been recognized by international war crimes tribunals . . . are 
conspiracy to commit genocide and common plan to wage aggressive war, which is a 
crime against the peace.”).  
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II. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE INCOHERENCE? 
A. Nuremberg: Common Plans and Criminal Organizations 
Any discussion of individual criminal responsibility under 
international law has to begin with Nuremberg.30 The drafters of 
the Nuremberg Charter sought to deal with the vast nature of 
Nazi criminality in two principal ways.31 First, the Charter on its 
face sets out conspiracy and common plan liability as forms of 
participation. In Article 6(a), Crimes Against Peace, the drafters 
included language that made an individual criminally 
responsible for “naming, planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation 
in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
of the foregoing.”32 In addition, the last paragraph of Article 6, 
following the definitions of Crimes against Peace, Crimes against 
Humanity and War Crimes, states: “Leaders, organizers, 
instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the 
foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any 
persons in execution of such plan.”33 These two excerpts appear 
to create both a substantive crime of conspiracy, in the former, 
and a form or mode of participation in the latter. 
For reasons well documented elsewhere,34 the Nuremberg 
Tribunal ruled that it had no jurisdiction to try persons for 
participating in a common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes 
                                                 
30. Both the trials at Nuremberg and in Tokyo post-World War II applied law 
agreed to by the Allies and the latter was based upon the design of the former. While 
the crimes defined were generally the same, see, for example, Zachary D. Kaufman, The 
Nuremberg Tribunal v. The Tokyo Tribunal: Designs, Staffs, and Operations, 43 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 753 (2010) for consideration of some of the differences. 
31. The four allied powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and 
the Soviet Union—established the Nuremberg Tribunal in the so-called London 
Agreement of August 8, 1945. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of 
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1951, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg 
Charter]. 
32. Id. art. 6(a). 
33. Id. art. 6. 
34. See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A 
PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992) (providing a first-hand account of the conduct of the trials 
before the Nuremberg Tribunal). 
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against humanity or war crimes.35 Only eight of the twenty-two 
defendants tried at the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg were convicted of conspiracy counts and only per 
Article 6(a)—Crimes against Peace.36 
The second way in which the Charter drafters sought to 
deal with the enormity of the Nazi regime’s crimes was to allow 
for the indictment and prosecution of certain organizations 
under Articles 9 and 10. 37  At the trial of the individual 
defendants, the plan was to have the Tribunal “declare [in 
connection with any act of which the individual may be 
convicted] that the group or organization of which the 
individual was a member was a criminal organization.” 38 
Subsequent to that, proof of individual membership in these 
organizations would be per se criminal in “national, military, or 
occupation” courts.39 The prosecution charged six groups or 
organizations with crimes against the peace, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and criminal conspiracy.40 The plan was, 
as indicated above, to have the Tribunal declare these groups 
illegal and then members “would be subject to arrest and 
prosecution before national courts based solely upon their 
membership.”41 Crucially, the burden of proof would be on the 
defendant to prove that membership was involuntary or that he 
did not know of the group’s criminal purpose.42 Only three of 
the groups were found by the Tribunal to be criminal 
organizations.43 Hundreds of trials went forward in occupation 
courts against members of these groups, but most of the 
tribunals refused to shift the burden of proof and the 
prosecution was thus left having to prove voluntariness and 
                                                 
35.  See Opinion and Judgement, United States, et al. v. Goering, et al. (October 1, 
1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L LAW 172 (1947). 
36. Id. at 331–33. 
37. For a more complete discussion of the proposed criminality of organizations 
under the Nuremberg Charter, see VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 784–87 (2d ed. 2011).  
38. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 31, art. 9. 
39. Id. art. 10. 
40. The groups were: the Reich Cabinet, Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, 
General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces, the SS, the Gestapo, 
and the SA (Stormtroopers). 
41. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 37, at 784. 
42. Id. 
43. The groups were: the SS, the Gestapo, and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi 
Party. 
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knowledge, which, of course, largely nullified any benefit of the 
planned process.44 
B. Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine 45 
1. Development of the Doctrine 
Following prosecutions at the Tribunal in Nuremberg, no 
international tribunal or court was convened until the ICTY.46 
The ICTY and the ICTR were established as tribunals in 
response to the specific contexts of mass violence in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively. Both tribunals were 
created as subsidiary organs of the Security Council and operate 
according to statutes adopted by that body.47 
Neither of the founding Statutes referred to conspiracy or 
common plan liability, except with regard to conspiracy to 
commit genocide, which has since 1948 been specifically 
provided for in the Genocide Convention.48 Reference to well-
established CIL was to be made under both Statutes in applying 
and interpreting the crimes.49 The Statutes were meant to codify 
that CIL, in response to the ex post facto criticism of the crimes 
prosecuted at Nuremberg.50  
                                                 
44. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 37, at 786–87. 
45. Much has been written about the doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise and 
the case that generated the doctrine, but at least a brief summary is necessary here to 
frame the larger discussion. See, e.g., Danner & Martinez, supra note 14; Scharf, supra 
note 25; Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 1 (2011). 
46. This is so despite post-World War II intentions to establish such a court as 
reflected in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Sept. 12, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. 6 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] 
(“Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall 
be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was 
committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with 
respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”). 
47. See ICTY Statute, supra note 1; ICTR Statute, supra note 1. 
48. Genocide Convention, supra note 46, art. 3(b). 
49. See ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (“The International Tribunal shall have 
the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law . . . .”); ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 1  (“The International 
Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law . . . .”).  
50. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter Report of the 
Secretary-General];  see also discussion infra notes 158–160 and accompanying text. 
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Dusko Tadić was the first defendant tried by the ICTY. He 
was acquitted by the Trial Chamber of killing five civilians in the 
village of Jaskići after the military group to which he belonged 
had passed through the village on an ethnic cleansing mission. 
In 1999, the Appeals Chamber reversed his acquittal on this 
crime, finding first that the only reasonable conclusion the Trial 
Chamber could have drawn is that the armed group to which 
the Appellant belonged killed the five men in Jaskići.51 However, 
the Appeals Chamber did acknowledge that the evidence did 
not show that Tadić personally killed any of the men and 
therefore the Chamber was left to decide: (i) whether the acts of 
one person can give rise to the criminal culpability of another 
where both participate in the execution of a common criminal 
plan; and (ii) the degree of mens rea required in such a case.52 
Although the ICTY statute does not mention common plan or 
purpose or joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”), the Tribunal 
found authorization for such a doctrine in Article 7(1) of the 
statute, which provides: “A person who planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in 
Articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually 
responsible for the crime.”53  
The Tadić Appeals Chamber read Article 7 broadly, finding 
that it was meant to reach all forms of individual responsibility, 
direct and indirect, that are supported by the express language 
of the Statute (aiding and abetting) and by CIL, and that the 
“object and purpose”54 of the Statute led to the conclusion that 
“all those who have engaged in serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, whatever the manner in which 
they may have perpetrated, or participated in the perpetration 
of those violations, must be brought to justice.” 55 The Appeals 
Chamber then engaged in a detailed examination of post-World 
War II case law at the Tribunal at Nuremberg, the Tokyo 
                                                 
51. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, 
para. 183 (Int’l Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
52. Id. para. 185. 
53. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 para. 1. 
54  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, 
para. 189 (Int’l Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
55. Id. para. 190. 
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Tribunal and the occupation trials conducted by the Allies.56 
The Chamber also looked to language in Article 25 of the Draft 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and to similar 
language in the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombing.57 This examination persuaded the Chamber 
that CIL supports individual criminal responsibility for those 
who engage in a common plan and the Chamber further 
distinguished three forms of such common plan or purpose 
liability. 
The basic form of JCE (“JCE I”) attributes individual 
criminal liability when all co-defendants act pursuant to a 
common plan or design and possess the same criminal intent, 
even if each co-perpetrator carries out a different role within the 
JCE. The mens rea for this form of JCE is the shared intent of all 
members to commit a certain crime.58 The second form of JCE 
(“JCE II”) is referred to as the “systemic” form and exists where 
the participants are involved in a criminal plan that is 
manifested by an institutional framework, such as a 
concentration camp, involving an organized system of ill 
treatment.59 JCE II is generally viewed as a variation of JCE I. 
The actus reus of this variant “was the active participation in the 
enforcement of a system of repression, as it could be inferred 
from the position of authority and the specific functions held by 
each accused.”60 The mens rea required is personal knowledge 
of the system of ill treatment and intent to further this 
concerted system.61  
The third and most controversial form of JCE is the so-
called “extended” form (“JCE III”). JCE III ascribes individual 
criminal liability in situations involving a common design to 
                                                 
56. See discussion infra notes 127–143 and accompanying text. 
57. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber 
paras. 221–22 (Int’l Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
58 . Id. para. 196 (“The objective and subjective prerequisites for imputing 
criminal responsibility to a participant who did not, or cannot be proven to have, 
effected the killing are as follows: (i) the accused must voluntarily participate in one 
aspect of the common design (for instance, by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the 
victim, or by providing material assistance to or facilitating the activities of his co-
perpetrators); and (ii) the accused, even if not personally effecting the killing, must 
nevertheless intend this result.”). 
59. See id. para. 202. 
60. Id. para. 203. 
61. Id. 
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commit a crime “where one of the perpetrators commits an act 
which, while outside the common design, was nevertheless a 
natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that 
common purpose.”62 The mens rea for JCE III combines the 
shared intent of the perpetrators to achieve the common 
criminal purpose and the “foreseeability of the possible 
commission by other members of the group of offences that do 
not constitute the object of the common criminal purpose.”63 
The Tadić Appeals Chamber referred to this mens rea as 
“advertent recklessness”64 and it has been analogized to the 
“felony murder doctrine” in common law jurisprudence,65 and 
to Pinkerton type conspiracy under US law.66 
In the illustration it offered of a JCE III situation, the 
Appeals Chamber made clear the result it would reach on the 
facts of Tadić. JCE III would exist, according to the Chamber, 
where there is: 
[A] common, shared intention on the part of a group to 
forcibly remove members of one ethnicity from their town, 
village or region . . . with the consequence that, in the 
course of doing so, one or more of the victims is shot and 
killed. While murder may not have been explicitly 
acknowledged to be part of the common design, it was 
nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of 
civilians at gunpoint might well result in the deaths of one 
or more of those civilians.67 
                                                 
62. Id. para. 204. 
63. Id. para. 220. 
64. Id. 
65. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 25. 
66. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); see also Ohlin, supra note 
45, at 703. 
67.  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber 
paras. 204 (Int’l Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
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2. Critique of the JCE Doctrine68 
The critique of JCE doctrine falls into two broad categories: 
first, an argument that the Tadić interpretation of and reliance 
upon the post-World War II case law as establishing CIL is 
incorrect; and, second, a substantive critique of the doctrine 
itself, particularly JCE III, as too indefinite, lacking clarity, too 
broad, and inconsistent with basic tenets of criminal law. The 
former category includes arguments that the ICTY improperly 
interpreted Article 7(1) of its statute to encompass common 
plan liability, and that the Tadić Appeals Chamber incorrectly 
interpreted the post-World War II case law to support such a 
doctrine. 69  For example, Professor Ohlin argues that “the 
arguments offered by the ICTY Appeals Chamber for an 
expansive reading of Article 7[, namely,] the object and purpose 
of the ICTY Statute to prosecute the architects of war crimes, the 
collective nature of genocide and war crimes, and the 
international case law on collective criminal action” each 
contain “deficiencies that cast doubt on the version of the 
doctrine of joint criminal enterprise constructed by the Tadić 
court.” 70  The second category of critique, while often also 
objecting to the Tadić interpretation of the post-World War II 
cases, focuses instead on the deficiencies of the JCE doctrine 
itself. For example, Professors Danner and Martinez do not 
wholly reject the ICTY’s use of JCE, they do, however, object to 
the scope of the doctrine, the failure of the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber to narrow the definition of an “enterprise,” and its 
application to “specific intent” crimes.71 
                                                 
68. The “extended” form of Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE III”) has been a 
controversial doctrine even within the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) itself. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, 
Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003) (espousing a 
doctrine of co-perpetration at odds with the JCE doctrine). This decision was 
overturned on appeal. Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006). 
69. For a discussion of both of these arguments, see Jens David Ohlin, Three 
Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 69 
(2007). 
70 Id. at 71. 
71. Danner & Martinez, supra note 14, at 102–51. 
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3. Other Tribunals and JCE 
Following the decision in Tadić, the ICTR, applying a 
statutory provision virtually identical to Article 7 of the ICTY 
Statute, also applied JCE in all its forms.72 In addition, other 
tribunals have applied forms of JCE, including the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), Special Panels for the Trial of 
Serious Crimes in East Timor, and most recently the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (“Lebanon Tribunal”).73 Moreover, the 
Iraqi Tribunal, which was a national court applying international 
law, found JCE applicable;74 the US Supreme Court alluded to 
the doctrine in a prosecution of a Guantanamo prisoner.75 
C. Co-Perpetration in the International Criminal Court 
1. Background Information on Individual Responsibility and the 
ICC 
Drafting of the Rome Statute, which created the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was completed before the 
ICTY had articulated the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise. 
This treaty was finalized in 1998 and took effect on July 1, 2002, 
when the requisite 60th State ratified it. Defining the limits of 
individual responsibility had been carefully considered in 
drafting the statute. Varying modes of liability were considered 
and some were explicitly rejected. The Rome Statute contains a 
detailed provision outlining the requirements for individual 
criminal responsibility that reflects the compromises made in its 
negotiations. Article 25 of the Statute provides in relevant part: 
                                                 
72. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda May 21, 1999). Note that many if not most of the ICTR 
prosecutions have been for genocide and thus subject to the crime of “conspiracy to 
commit genocide.” See also ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 6. 
73. The Lebanon Tribunal interestingly found JCE to be a doctrine generally 
supported by customary international law (“CIL”), not just under ICTY Article 7(a) 
language. See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/1 (Special Trib. for 
Lebanon Feb. 16, 2011). It also noted in passing that the ICC’s alternative co-
perpetration based upon the “control theory” was not, unlike JCE, “not recognized in 
customary international law.” Id. para. 18. 
74. See Ian M. Ralby, Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Iraqi High Tribunal, 28 B.U. 
INT’L L. J. 281 (2010). 
75. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 58 U.S. 557, 611 n.40 (2006). 
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In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly 
with another or through another person, regardless of 
whether that other person is criminally responsible; 
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a 
crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; 
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a 
crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its 
attempted commission, including providing the means for 
its commission; 
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or 
attempted commission of such a crime by a group of 
persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution 
shall be intentional and shall either: 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal 
activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such 
activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the 
group to commit the crime . . . .76 
2. The ICC Weighs In 
Many scholars, including some who participated in the 
drafting of the Rome Statute, anticipated that the ICC would use 
the language of Article 25 to implement a form of JCE in the 
new court.77 The first opportunity for the Court to address this 
                                                 
76. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3). Article 25 also makes provision for the 
crime of incitement to commit genocide and attempt: 
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to 
commit genocide; 
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur 
because of circumstances independent of the person’s intentions. However, a 
person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents 
the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this 
Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and 
voluntarily gave the criminal purpose.  
Id.  
77 . See, e.g., William Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 103–04 (2d ed. 2004) (“Inspired by this provision in the Rome 
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issue came in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges in the Lubanga case.78 The Prosecutor 
charged Lubanga “with criminal responsibility under Article 
25(3)(a) of this Statute, which covers the notions of direct 
perpetration (commission of a crime in person), co-
perpetration (commission of a crime jointly with another 
person) and indirect perpetration (commission through 
another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible).” 79  The Prosecution also referred to 
Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute in submitting that, in 
addition to Article 25(3)(a) liability, Lubanga was potentially 
subject to Article 25(3)(d). The prosecutor “believe[d] that 
‘common purpose’ in terms of Article (3)(d) could properly be 
considered as a “third applicable mode of criminal liability,” 
and therefore, “request[ed] that the Pre-Trial Chamber make 
findings that the legal requirements of these three modes of 
liability are either satisfied or not satisfied.”80 The Prosecution 
made this request in light of the possibility that any one of these 
theories might not prevail. In that case, it would “promote 
efficiency” if the Prosecution could rely on a previous finding 
that charges might be based on an alternative theory.81 The 
Prosecution does, however, assert that “co-perpetration” 
pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) “best represents the criminal 
                                                                                                             
Statute, the judges of the ICTY have developed what has come to be known as ‘joint 
criminal enterprise’ theory of liability, and it would seem plausible that ICC judges will 
be strongly influenced by this case law in their application of Article 25.”); Danner & 
Martinez, supra note 14, at 154 (“The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) states that an individual is criminally responsible for a crime if he 
commits, orders, or aids and abets the crime, or ‘[i]n any other way contributes to the 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.’ 
Thus, JCE, under one of its alternative names (common purpose doctrine) falls within 
the ambit of the ICC Statute.”); Ohlin, supra note 69, at 77 (“It is perhaps laudable that 
the Rome Statute includes a more detailed provision on joint criminal enterprise in 
Article 25.”). 
78. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc
266175.pdf. 
79. Id. para. 318 (citing Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC‐01/04‐01/06‐
356‐Conf‐Anx1, Documents Containing the Charges para. 27 (Aug. 28, 2006)). 
80 . Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Document 
Containing the Charges para. 12(ii) (Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc192552.pdf. 
81. Id. 
520 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:501 
responsibility for crimes with which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is 
charged.”82 
The Pre-Trial Chamber (“PTC”) made two early 
determinations that influenced its final decision. First, it 
decided that if it finds that there is criminal responsibility for 
defendant Lubanga as a co-perpetrator under Article 25(3)(a), 
“the question as to whether it may also consider the other forms 
of accessory liability provided for in Articles 25(3)(b) to (d) of 
the Statute or the alleged superior responsibility of Thomas 
Dyilo Lubanga under Article 28 [would] become[] moot.”83 
Note that in making this determination, the PTC foreshadowed 
its later conclusion that Article 25(3)(d) provides for a form of 
accessory liability only and rendered its discussion of 25(3)(d) 
dicta. Second, in focusing on the concept of co-perpetration as 
set out in Article 25(3)(a) and finding it:  
[R]ooted in the idea that when the sum of co-ordinated 
individual contributions of a plurality of persons results in 
the realisation of all the objective elements of a crime, any 
person making a contribution can be held vicariously 
responsible for the contributions of all the others and, as a 
result, can be considered as a principal to the whole crime.84  
The PTC concluded that “the definitional criterion of the 
concept of co-perpetration is linked to the distinguishing 
criterion between principals and accessories to a crime where a 
criminal offence is committed by a plurality of persons.”85 
What the Chamber seems to mean here is that the criterion 
that they will adopt as key to co-perpetration will distinguish that 
form of joint liability from accessory liability (i.e., if you meet 
this criterion then principal liability will attach under Article 
25(3)(a)). This does not, on its face, seem to preclude asserting 
principal liability under another provision, Article 25(3)(d) 
being the most likely, though that is where the PTC seems to 
end up. 
                                                 
82 . Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Document 
Addressing Matters that Were Discussed at the Confirmation Hearing para. 27 (Dec. 4, 
2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc243643.pdf.  
83. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges para. 321 (Jan. 29, 2007). 
84. Id. para. 326. 
85. Id. para. 327. 
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The PTC then considered three possible approaches to the 
distinction between principal and accessory liability upon which 
the Article 25(3)(a) category of co-perpetration will depend. 
The first is the objective approach, which focuses on the 
completion of objective elements of the crime (i.e., the actus 
reus), so that “only those who physically carry out one or more 
of the objective elements of the offence can be considered 
principals to the crime. 86  The second is the “subjective 
approach,” which the PTC identifies with the ICTY and its JCE 
jurisprudence. This approach “moves the focus from the level of 
contribution to the commission of the offence as the 
distinguishing criterion between principals and accessories, and 
places it instead on the state of mind in which the contribution 
to the crime was made.”87 The PTC concludes that only those 
with the “shared intent” to commit the crime “can be 
considered principals to the crime, regardless of the level of 
their contribution to the commission.”88 The third approach, 
and the one adopted by the Chamber, is what the opinion 
characterizes as the “concept of control.” 89  This approach, 
which the Chamber contends is applied in numerous legal 
systems but which is largely based upon German law,90 maintains 
that principals to a crime include not only those who physically 
perpetrate the objective elements of a crime, but “also . . . those 
who, in spite of being removed from the scene of the crime, 
control or mastermind its commission because they decide 
whether and how the offence will be committed.”91 Note that in 
explaining these approaches and their relevance to drawing a 
line between principal and accessorial liability, the PTC glosses 
                                                 
86. Id. para. 328. 
87. Id. para. 329. 
88 . Id. This conclusion by the Pre-Trial Chmber (“PTC”) does not seem 
adequately to recognize the required actus reus for JCE in its various forms and thus 
presents an overly simplified view of that doctrine. It is not all clear that the application 
of JCE precludes a finding of accessorial liability in a given case. 
89. Id. para. 330. 
90. The Chamber essentially cites German law and literature, or cases citing 
German law, in support of its decision. See, e.g., id. paras. 346–48 and accompanying 
footnotes. 
91. Id. 
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over the conflict that exists regarding them in the German 
domestic law and commentary upon which it relies.92 
The PTC spends a great deal of time defining the “concept 
of control,” noting that it has both an objective and a subjective 
element: the former “consisting of the appropriate factual 
circumstances for exercising control over the crime” and the 
latter “consisting of the awareness of such circumstances.”93 The 
PTC concludes that this approach characterizes as principals 
only those who have “control over the commission of the 
offense—and are aware of having such control.”94 
The PTC further distinguishes Article 25(3)(a) from 
(3)(d), “which is closely akin to the concept of joint criminal 
enterprise or common purpose doctrine adopted by the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY,” by concluding that Article 25(3)(d) 
applies only to accessorial liability and a “residual form of 
accessory liability” applicable only if 25(3)(b) or (c) does not 
apply.95 This conclusion is not self-evident from the language of 
the statute, nor widely shared. An argument could certainly be 
made that Article 25(3)(d) could provide for another form of 
principal liability, particularly in a large-scale crime based upon 
a common plan versus the type of co-perpetration provided for 
in Lubanga.96 Once the PTC had decided to embrace the notion 
                                                 
92. For a comprehensive and excellent exploration of the control theory of 
perpetration, see Neha Jain, The Control Theory of Perpetration in International Law, 12 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 159 (2011). 
93. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges para. 331 (Jan. 29, 2007). 
94. Id. para. 332. This is so “because: i. they physically carry out the objective 
elements of the offence (commission of the crime in person or direct perpetration); ii. 
they control the will of those who carry out the objective elements of the offince 
(commission of the crime through another person, or indirect perpetration; or iii. 
They have along with others, control over the offence by reason of the essential tasks 
assigned to them (commission of the crime jointly with others, or co-perpetration).” Id. 
95. Id. paras. 335–37. 
96. That section could also be read as providing an alternative and not subsidiary 
form of liability: “Indeed in Furundzija, the ICTY held that these provisions confirm 
that international (criminal) law recognizes a distinction between aiding and abetting a 
crime and participation in a common criminal plan as ‘two separate categories of 
liability for criminal participation . . . – co-perpetrators who participate in a joint 
criminal enterprise, on the one hand, and aiders and abettors, on the other.’” Kai 
Ambos, Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 475, 484 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 
2008). Indeed, the Appeals Chamber in Tadić went to great lengths to distinguish the 
JCE doctrine it was announcing from aiding and abetting under the ICTY Statute: 
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of the concept of control as a distinguishing feature of principal 
versus accessory liability, the PTC “considers that the concept of 
co-perpetration embodied in Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute 
coincides with that of joint control over the crime by reason of 
the essential nature of the various contributions to the 
commission of the crime.”97 Key to the application of this model 
to joint or co-perpetration by two or more persons is the idea 
that no one perpetrator need exercise overall control over the 
offense, but that they share control in the sense that each of 
them “could frustrate the commission of the crime by not 
carrying out his or her task.”98 
Following the decision in Lubanga concerning the control 
theory of co-perpetration, the ICC PTC in the Katanga & Chui 
case extended this doctrine to encompass joint indirect 
perpetration, a much more controversial version of the control 
theory.99 As Professor Jain notes, the “heavy reliance of the 
                                                                                                             
In light of the preceding propositions it is now appropriate to distinguish 
between acting in pursuance of a common purpose or design to commit a 
crime, and aiding and abetting. 
(i) The aider and abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated by 
another person, the principal. 
(ii) In the case of aiding and abetting no proof is required of the existence of 
a common concerted plan, let alone of the pre-existence of such a plan. No 
plan or agreement is required: indeed, the principal may not even know 
about the accomplice’s contribution. 
(iii) The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, 
encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific 
crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction of civilian 
property, etc.) and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration 
of the crime. By contrast, in the case of acting in pursuance of a common 
purpose or design, it is sufficient for the participant to perform acts that in 
some way are directed to the furthering of the common plan or purpose. 
(iv) In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is 
knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the 
commission of a specific crime by the principal. By contrast, in the case of 
common purpose or design more is required (i.e., either intent to perpetrate 
the crime or intent to pursue the common criminal design plus foresight that 
those crimes outside the criminal common purpose were likely to be 
committed) as stated above. 
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, para. 229 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
97. Id.  para. 341. 
98. Id. para. 342. 
99. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01//07, Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges paras. 495–99 (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf. 
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Katanga and Chui Pre-Trial Chamber on theory of 
Organisationsherrschaft is controversial, given that this theory 
does not enjoy wide support in domestic legal systems, with the 
exception of Germany and a few Latin American states that are 
heavily influenced by German legal doctrine.”100 It is noteworthy 
that “the Chamber cites Claus Roxin almost exclusively in its 
elucidation of the elements of the doctrine.”101 
3. Critiques of the ICC’s Control Theory of Perpetration 
Professor Jain’s article has many interesting things to say 
about the control theory of perpetration and its potential to 
provide a nuanced approach to the complex questions 
surrounding modes of liability in international criminal law. She 
does, however, have several concerns with the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s embrace of this theory. Among them, she notes that 
the “sparseness of the elements outlined by Lubanga makes it 
difficult to assess how they would be applied to concrete cases 
before the court.” 102  In addition, she points out that over 
reliance on one theory of control, Roxin’s, which has wide 
support in the scholarly community but has not been adopted 
by the German courts, is problematic, as is the Katanga PTC’s 
reliance on indirect co-perpetration, when “there is 
considerable debate even in German academic circles about the 
viability of the doctrine” since “[t]he individual elements of the 
doctrine . . . have been subjected to considerable criticism, 
and prominent academics in Germany reject the application of 
the doctrine altogether in favor of co-perpetration and even 
secondary responsibility for instigation.”103 
Regarding the issue Professor Jain characterizes as the 
“substantive issue of whether these are theoretically sound 
modes of liability that the ICC can legitimately adopt for 
international crimes,” several concerns have been raised by 
scholars.104 Yet, there is also a procedural objection to the ICC’s 
                                                 
100. Jain, supra note 92, at 184. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 183. 
103. Id. at 186. 
104. See, e.g., Ohlin, supra note 45 (rejecting control as the basis for liability under 
Article 25 and arguing that a theory of “Joint Intentions” would restore mens rea to a 
central role in developing a dotrine to govern individual liability for collective crimes). 
But see Jain, supra note 92, at 186 (extensively critiquing Ohlin’s critique); see also 
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interpretation of Article 25. The PTCs have seemingly ignored 
the direction given to the Court in Article 21 regarding which 
law is to be applied in the Court. In the name of applying the 
language of “this Statute,” the PTC actually applies, without 
adequate explanation, a narrow doctrine not widely accepted, 
nor supported explicitly or implicitly by the travaux preparatoires 
or international law more generally. 105  This issue will be 
explored more fully in Part IV of this Article. 
D. The Cambodian Tribunal’s Decision Regarding JCE 
The last piece of incoherence in the doctrine derives from 
the decision in May 2010, by the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), a hybrid court charged with 
trying “those most responsible” for crimes of the Khmer Rouge, 
thirty-five years after the fact.106 That court decided that the CIL 
between 1975 and 1979 supported the application of JCE I and 
JCE II, but not that of JCE III. The context of this decision was 
an appeal of the Co-Investigative Judges Order on JCE 
concerning the: 
[O]ngoing judicial investigation against NUON Chea, IENG 
Sary, IENG Thirith, KHIEU Samphan and KAING Guek Eav 
alias “Duch” relating to charges of crimes against humanity 
and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions dated 12 
August 1949, offences defined and punishable under 
Articles 5, 6, 29 (new) of the law on the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, dated 
27 October 2004 (“ECCC Law”).107 
                                                                                                             
OSIEL, supra note 4, at 33–65 (critiquing the indirect perpetration model relied on in 
Katanga). 
105. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21. 
106. See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea, Royal Decree No. NS/RKM/0801/12, art. 1 (Aug. 10, 2001) 
(Cambodia): 
The purpose of this law is to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic 
Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious 
violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and 
custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were 
committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979. 
107 . Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC38), Public Decision on the 
Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 1 
(May 20, 2010) (Cambodia). 
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This appeal sought to quash the order of the Co-
Investigating Judges that the doctrine of Joint Criminal 
Enterprise was applicable law in the ECCC.108 The defendants 
argued that JCE should be inapplicable because: 
such application would violate the principle of legality 
because JCE was not acknowledged as customary 
international law before or during the period of 1975-
1979,nor is it presently recognized as such and 2)JCE is not 
specified in the ECCC Establishment Law, nor is it a part of 
Cambodian law or recognized by any international 
convention enforceable before the ECCC.109 
After resolving various procedural matters, the PTC reached the 
merits of the defendants’ appeal. 
The PTC first cited the Tadić decision, its three categories 
of JCE and its understanding of the common actus reus for all 
three types of JCE, “namely: (i) a common plan . . . ; (ii) 
involving a plurality of persons[;] and (iii) an individual 
contribution by the charged person or accused to the execution 
of the common plan . . . .”110 The Chamber also sets out the 
variations in mens rea established earlier, which attach to each 
form of JCE and characterizes the “concept of JCE as a form of 
criminal responsibility in international law” as a “unique” one, 
which “combines features from different legal traditions and has 
been applied and shaped by actors from varying legal 
backgrounds.”111 The Chamber makes reference to prosecutors 
and judges at the post-World War II commissions and tribunals 
who: 
applied the concepts on responsibility established in the 
Nuremberg Charter and Control Council No. 10 not only to 
impose responsibility on those perpetrators who physically 
committed acts for their violations of humanitarian law, but 
also on those individuals who, pursuing a common design 
with others, participated in the commission of such 
crimes(s).112 
                                                 
108. Id. para. 2. 
109. Id. 
110. Id.  para. 38. 
111. Id.  paras 39–40. 
112. Id.  para. 40. 
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Some of those crimes, the Chamber noted, involved mob 
violence against Allied military and resistance forces in which 
the crimes were physically committed by individuals who shared 
a common intent with the accused, who was not remote from 
the perpetration of the crime. The tribunal also identified 
crimes “perpetrated on a broader scale and involving state 
agents, the persons convicted were usually remote from the 
physical perpetration of the crimes and no consideration was 
given to the criminal responsibility or even state of mind of the 
perpetrators.”113 
The Chamber acknowledged that the relevant Cambodian 
law of the 1970s, which was based upon the civil law, did 
recognize a form of “co-perpetration,” which resembles JCE I 
and II in that it treats as co-perpetrators “not only those who 
physically perform the actus reus of the crime, but also those who 
possess the mens rea for the crime and participate or contribute 
to its commission.”114 However, these two doctrines, JCE and co-
perpetration, are not co-extensive, since JCE would appear to 
embrace situations in which the accused is “more remote from 
‘actual perpetration of the’ crime than the direct perpetration 
required under domestic law.”115 
In establishing the framework for its decision, the Tribunal 
makes reference to Article 33 (2) (new) of the ECCC Law, which 
requires that the “ECCC shall exercise its jurisdiction in 
accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and 
due process of law, as set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”).”116 The PTC referred specifically to the principle of 
nullum criimen sine lege found in Article 15(1).117 The Chamber 
set out four pre-conditions that therefore must be satisfied in 
order for a particular form of criminal responsibility to fall 
within the ECCC’s jurisdiction: 
                                                 
113. Id. 
114. Id.  para. 41. 
115. Id. 
116. Id.  para. 43. 
117.  Id.; see International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights art. 15(1), Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on 
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offense, under 
national or international law, at the time when it was committed.”). 
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(i) it must be provided for in the [ECCC Law], explicitly or 
implicitly; 
(ii) it must have existed under customary international law 
at the relevant time; 
(iii) the law providing for that form of liability must have 
been sufficiently accessible at the relevant time to anyone 
who acted in such a way; 
(iv) such person must have been able to foresee that he 
could be held criminally liable for his actions if 
apprehended.118 
In applying these pre-conditions, the Chamber first rejected 
arguments by the defense that the OCIJ erred in finding that the 
ECCC could apply customary international law. The defense 
based this argument on the fact that the ECCC is in essence a 
domestic Cambodian court in a country adhering to a dualist 
system, without “specific directives in the Constitution, 
legislation or national jurisprudence incorporating customary 
law into domestic law.”119 The Chamber concluded that Article 2 
of the ECCC Law provided jurisdiction to apply forms of 
responsibility recognized by customary international law at the 
relevant time.120 Having found that the ECCC had jurisdiction 
both to prosecute these defendants for violations of IHL, and to 
apply CIL, the Chamber then turned to what it characterized as 
the “core of the Appeals, that is whether there was in 1975–1979 
a customary law basis for JCE and, in the alternative, its 
systematic and extended forms, and if so, whether these 
form(sic) of responsibility were sufficiently accessible and 
foreseeable to the Charged Persons.”121 
                                                 
118 . Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC38), Public Decision on the 
Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 
43 (May 20, 2010) (Cambodia). 
119. Id. para. 48. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. para. 50. 
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1. Was JCE a Recognized Form of Criminal Responsibility under 
CIL Prior to 1975? 
Despite some initial confusing language with regard to 
determining when CIL exists,122 the Chamber cites the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice for language regarding the 
legitimacy of CIL as a source of international law, which requires 
the court to apply “international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law.”123 The Chamber finds that, in 
terms of state practice, “‘not only must the acts concerned 
amount to a settled practice, but they must be such, or be 
carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this 
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law 
requiring it.’” 124  The Chamber then engaged in a full 
consideration of the Tadić Appeals Judgment. It noted that the 
Order appealed in this case “logically refers to the above ICTY 
seminal decision on JCE as persuasive authority for its 
conclusion that, ‘[c]onsidering the international aspects of the 
ECCC and the fact that the jurisprudence relied upon in 
articulating JCE pre-existed the events under investigation at the 
ECCC, there is a basis under international law for applying JCE 
before the ECCC.’”125 
The PTC then proceeded to differentiate JCE I and II from 
JCE III. As to the former, which the Chamber characterized as 
“basic and systemic forms of JCE,” the Chamber refused to limit 
its assessment of “whether Tadić incorrectly” found JCE liability 
to a consideration of the authorities relied upon by the Appeals 
Chamber in that case.126 Instead, the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber 
found the Tadić opinion: 
                                                 
122. See, e.g., id. para. 53 (“When determining the state of customary international 
law in relation to the existence of a crime or form of individual responsibility, a court 
shall assess existence of ‘common, consistent and concordant’ state practice or opinio 
juris . . . .”). 
123. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1, June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (annexed to U.N. Charter). 
124 . Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC38), Public Decision on the 
Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 
53 (May 20, 2010) (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. & Ger./Neth.), 
1969 I.C.J. 3, 77 (Feb. 20)) (Cambodia). 
125. Id. para. 54. 
126. Id. para. 57. 
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“[R]einforced by the use made of the doctrine of common 
plan or enterprise in . . . .”: 1) Article 6 of the London 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (“London 
Charter” or the “Nuremberg Charter”), providing that 
persons “participating in the formulation or execution of a 
Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit crimes against 
peace, war crimes, or crimes against humanity are 
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in 
execution of such plan”; and 2) the Control Council Law 
No. 10, which was a legislative act jointly passed in 1945 by 
the four Occupying Powers, reflecting international 
agreement among the Great Powers on the law applicable to 
international crimes and the jurisdiction of the military 
courts called upon to rule on such crimes, providing that 
both the principal perpetrator and a person “connected 
with plans or enterprises involving” the commission of a 
crime were considered to have ‘committed’ that crime.127 
The PTC concluded that these instruments show an 
intention to find criminal liability for one who does not 
physically perpetrate a crime, but intentionally participates in 
the formulation or execution of a common plan. Therefore, 
“[t]his constitutes undeniable support of the basic and systemic 
forms (JCE I and II) of JCE liability.”128 
Regarding the preliminary question of whether judicial 
decisions should form the basis for determining customary 
international law, the PTC found such case law to be “an 
authoritative interpretation of their constitutive instruments” 
and that it “can be relied upon to determine the state of 
customary international law with respect to the existence of JCE 
as a form of criminal responsibility” at the time relevant for this 
case.129 The chamber then considered the eight cases relied 
upon by Tadić in support of JCE I and II.130 It also accepted the 
                                                 
127. Id. 
128. Id. para. 58. 
129. Id. para. 60. 
130. Id. paras. 62–63 (citing The Trial of Otto Sandrock and Three Others, British 
Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Held at the Court House, Almelo, Holland on 24-
26 November, 1945, reprinted in 1 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS 
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 35 (1947); Hoelzer et al., 1 CANADIAN MILITARY COURT 
AURICH GERMANY, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 25 MARCH-6 APRIL, 1946, at 341, 347, 349 
(RCAF Binder 181.009) (D2474); Trial of Gustav Alfred Jepsen and Others, reprinted in 
PROCEEDINGS OF A WAR CRIMES TRIAL HELD AT LUNEBERG, GERMANY (13-23 AUGUST, 
1946), Judgement of 24 August 1946 (original transcripts in Public Record Office, Kew, 
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representation of the OCP that there are “more relevant post-
World War II international military cases than the ones cited by 
Tadić and considered two of those to be particularly relevant.131 
Ultimately, the PTC concluded that, “[i]n the light of the 
London Charter, Control Council Law No. 10, international 
cases and authoritative pronouncements” there is “no doubt 
that JCE I and JCE II were recognized forms of responsibility in 
customary international law at the time relevant for Case 002.”132 
Moreover, because these forms of responsibility were recognized 
in CIL, and were forms the Chamber held to “have an 
underpinning in the Cambodian law concept of co-authorship 
applicable at the time,” such liability was “sufficiently accessible 
and foreseeable to the defendants.”133 
The PTC finally addressed the “more controversial form of 
JCE”134—JCE III. The defendants here argued that JCE III was 
not supported by customary international law and that its 
application would therefore violate the principle of legality. 
Support for the JCE III doctrine was lacking, the Appellants 
argued, because in the World War II cases cited, “the military 
courts only issued a simple guilty verdict and made no extensive 
                                                                                                             
Richmond); Trial of Franz Schonfeld and Others, in British Military Court, Essen, June 11-26, 
1946, reprinted in 11 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra, at 68; Trial of 
Feurstein and Others, reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF A WAR CRIMES TRIAL HELD AT 
HAMBURG, GERMANY (4-24 AUGUST, 1948), Judgement of 24 August 1948 (original 
records in Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond); United States v. Ohlenforf et al., 
reprinted in 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 3 (1951); Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and 
Thirty-nine Others, General Military Government Court of the United States Zone, Dachau, 
Germany, 15 November-13 December, 1945, reprinted in 11 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS, supra, at 5; Trial of Josef Kramer and 44 others, British Military Court, Luneberg, 
17 September-17 November, 1945, reprinted in 2 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS, supra, at 1 (1945)). 
131. Id. para. 65 (“The Pre-Trial Chamber finds two of the Control Council law 
No. 10 cases, the Justice and RuSHA cases, to be particularly apposite to determining 
whether the basic and systemic forms of JCE (JCE I & II) formed part of customary 
international law at the time relevant for Case 002. These cases have been discussed 
extensively by the ICTR Appeals Chamber, who inter alia relied on these sources to 
conclude that, as of 1992, customary international law permitted the imposition of 
criminal liability on a participant in a common plan to commit genocide.”). 
132. Id. para. 69. 
133. Id. para. 72. 
134. Id. para. 74. 
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legal finding on the issue of common criminal plan.”135 The 
Appellants also argued that Tadić:  
‘relied in large part on unpublished cases, mostly from Italy 
[ . . .] which has adopted a unitary system whereby any 
person who intervenes in the commission of a crime is liable 
as a perpetrator, whereas most national criminal law systems 
have adopted an approach that makes a distinction between 
perpetrators or principals to the crime and accessories to 
the crime or secondary parties. . . .’136 
The OCP countered that the Appellants’ arguments ignore 
substantial evidence supporting the Tadić finding of JCE III and 
argued that “‘many advanced jurisdictions recognized modes of 
co-perpetration similar to JCE III, [including] conspiracy, the 
felony murder doctrine, the concept of association de malfaiteurs 
and numerous other doctrines of co-perpetration.’”137 
The PTC agreed with the Appellants that the authorities 
relied upon by Tadić “do not provide sufficient evidence of 
consistent state practice or opinio juris at the time relevant to” 
the Cambodian prosecution.138 The Chamber “concludes that 
JCE III was not recognized as a form of responsibility applicable 
to violations of international humanitarian law” for several 
reasons.139 First, neither the Nuremberg Charter nor Control 
Council Law No. 10 specifically provide for JCE III.140 Second, 
the Chamber discounted the Tadić reliance on post-World War 
II cases,141 finding that while the facts in those cases might be 
consistent with a finding of JCE III, “in the absence of a 
reasoned judgement in these cases, one cannot be certain of the 
basis of liability actually retained by the military courts.”142 
                                                 
135. Id. para. 75. 
136. Id. (citing Ieng Sary Appeal, para. 40) (alterations in original). 
137. Id. para. 76. 
138. Id. para. 77. 
139. Id. 
140 . Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC38), Public Decision on the 
Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
para. 78 (May 20, 2010) (Cambodia) (finding the two other international instruments 
relied upon by Tadić were not relevant since they were not in existence in the relevant 
time period of 1975–1979). 
141. See, e.g., Trial of Erich Heyer and Six Others (Essen Lynching Case), British Military 
Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Essen, dec. 18-19 and 21-22 1945, reprinted in 1 LAW 
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 130, at 1. 
142. Id. para. 79. 
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Third, the Chamber found that the Italian war crimes cases 
relied upon by the ICTY were not appropriate precedents for 
establishing CIL because they took place in domestic courts and 
applied domestic law and do not, therefore constitute 
international case law.143 
The PTC also went on to consider whether general 
principles of criminal law supported the Tadić tribunal’s finding 
of JCE III, finding “a number of ICTY Appeals decisions state or 
imply that it is acceptable to have recourse to such principles in 
defining not only the elements of an international crime, but 
also the scope of a form of responsibility for an international 
crime.”144 The PTC made clear its understanding that Tadić 
itself:  
only referred to national legislation and case law to show 
that the notion of common purpose upheld in international 
law has an underpinning in many national systems. . . . 
[T]hese domestic sources could not be relied upon as 
irrefutable evidence of international principles or rules 
under the doctrine that general principles of law are 
recognized by the nations of the world; for this reliance to 
be permissible, most, if not all, countries must have adopted 
the same notion of common purpose. In Tadić, the court 
concluded that this was not the case.145 
Therefore, the Chamber finds JCE III is not applicable 
before the ECCC.146 
III. ANALYSIS: CAN THE INCOHERENCE BE MADE 
COHERENT AND WHY DOES THAT MATTER? 
To take the second question first, it matters for several 
reasons. First, coherent and clear definitions of crimes, 
including forms of responsibility/modes of participation in 
                                                 
143. Id. para. 82. 
144. Id. para. 84 (citing Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95/1-T, Trial 
Judgement, para. 177 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) 
(holding that “to arrive at an accurate definition of rape based on the criminal law of 
specificity . . ., it is necessary to look for principles of criminal law common to the 
major legal systems. These principles may be derived, with all due caution, from 
national laws,”); Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgement, paras. 
34–42 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004)). 
145. Id. para. 85. 
146. Id. para. 88. 
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crimes, go to the question of the credibility of international 
criminal law and the international criminal justice system. 
Having the same behavior charged and punished differently 
depending upon the tribunal in which the case is heard makes it 
difficult to argue that ICL and the international justice system 
are a mature regime. Moreover, the nullum crimen sine lege rule 
requires that there be a clear, definite statement of the law 
before a defendant can be charged with a crime.147 And yet, the 
current disarray in the doctrine shows no signs of being resolved 
any time soon. 
A. Does Co-Perpetration per the ICC “Win”? 
 The PTCs of the ICC have now definitively rejected joint 
criminal enterprise as the framework for charging those who 
commit a crime collectively. The PTCs have instead elected to 
adopt a form of co-perpetration based upon “control” as the 
only form under which perpetrators may be charged as 
principals. The PTC, at least in Lubanga, has expressly rejected 
JCE III—the extended form—but its rationale seems also to be 
inconsistent with JCE I and II, at least as forms of principal 
liability. Those latter two forms have quite broad acceptance, 
pre- and post-Lubanga, not just in the ICTY and the ICTR, but 
also in the various hybrid courts, even those, such as the ECCC, 
which reject JCE III. This is perhaps so because these forms, 
particularly JCE I (and JCE II if it is viewed as a subset or 
variation of JCE I), find broad support in the domestic law of 
states and, arguably, in CIL. 
Although the Rome Statute does create a permanent 
international criminal court with, perhaps, the goal of having 
such a court be the ultimate arbiter of international criminal law 
doctrine, such an outcome seems unlikely in the short term—or 
even the near long term. This is so for the following reasons. 
                                                 
147. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22(2) (“The definition of a crime 
shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, 
the definition shall be interpreted in favor of the person being investigated, prosecuted 
or convicted.”). 
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1. Complementarity 
Key to the regime created by the Rome Statute is the 
principle of complementarity. This principle is expressed in 
Article I of the Statute, establishing the international criminal 
court and making it “complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.”148 Article 17 of the Statute sets out the details of 
the “complementarity” principle. It provides that the Court shall 
not take jurisdiction over a case where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State 
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or 
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to 
prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision 
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute.149 
Article 17 further identifies “unwillingness” to investigate 
or prosecute as involving situations in which “proceedings were 
or are being undertaken . . . for the purpose of shielding the 
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court”; [t]here has been an unjustified 
delay”; or “the proceedings were not or are not being 
conducted independently or impartially and they were or are 
being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice.”150 In ascertaining “inability” to investigate or prosecute, 
Article 17(3) directs that the “Court shall consider whether, due 
to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national 
judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the 
necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry 
out its proceedings.”151 
The consequence of these provisions is that the Court must 
defer to States which seek to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes. This is key to the scheme of the ICC, which 
                                                 
148. Id. art. 1. 
149. Id. art. 17. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
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thus encourages States to enact domestic law under which they 
may prosecute international crimes committed on their territory 
and/or by their own citizens.152 Some States will, of course, 
assert jurisdiction more broadly under so-called “universal 
jurisdiction” statutes, which permit them, to the extent allowed 
by international law, 153  to prosecute even those without 
nationality or territoriality links to the forum.154 This means, of 
course, that as States prosecute crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and genocide in domestic courts, those courts will find it 
necessary to interpret the various precepts of ICL, including the 
substantive crimes themselves and forms of participation. 
Nothing would bind such a domestic court to the interpretations 
of the ICC, for example to choosing co-perpetration based on a 
control model. In fact, history would suggest instead that States 
would make reference to CIL in defining these terms. 
2. The Infrequency of Decision Making by the ICC 
Given its limited resources, political constraints, and its 
charge to “exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most 
serious crimes of international concern,”155 the decisions of the 
Court will be few and far between. The record of the Court thus 
far is very sparse.156 Even preliminary decisions by the PTCs are 
few.157 It will take decades for the Court to establish even the 
most basic of interpretations of the Rome Statute. While having 
a permanent court is meant to address both the logistical 
difficulties of establishing ad hoc tribunals to deal with mass 
atrocities after the fact and thereby to deter future crimes and 
                                                 
152. See generally Doherty & McCormack, supra note 13. 
153. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J.  3, 
24 (Feb. 14) (holding that sitting foreign ministers are immune from prosecution 
under another State’s universal jurisdiction statute). 
154. Though States with the broadest statutes have in recent years yielded to 
international political pressure and have narrowed the reach of their universal 
jurisdiction statutes. See generally Steven Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A 
Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888 (2003). 
155. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1. 
156. As of February, 2014 only eighteen cases in eight situations have been 
brought before the Court. 
157. For the most recent summary of the current status of cases, see Situations and 
Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations and cases/
Pages/situations and cases.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).  
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criminals by establishing a forum to provide swift and certain 
justice, the reality of such a scheme seems far off. 
3. Ad Hoc/Hybrid Tribunals Will Continue to Play a Role 
One of the consequences of the Court’s limitations will 
probably be continued use of ad hoc tribunals. Even as the 
tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda wind down and 
prepare to turn their prosecutions over to national courts under 
their completion strategies, more use is being made of hybrid 
tribunals.158 These hybrid tribunals have continued to be created 
even after establishment of the ICC.159 Along with domestic 
courts, these hybrid courts supplement, and complement, the 
work of the ICC. They have the advantage of being tailored for a 
specific situation, taking into account the cultural, and local 
political aspects of the conflict involved. They also may be 
viewed as more legitimate by citizens of the State involved, as 
opposed to a tribunal far away.160 Judges for the State involved 
also may add to the credibility of the decision making in the eyes 
of the populace. There may be disadvantages to such tribunals 
as well, hence the determination of the international 
community to create a permanent court. And, as with domestic 
courts, these courts have not been and may not be bound by any 
interpretations of ICL set forth by the ICC.161 
B. The Role of Interpretation in Making the Incoherent Coherent 
Related to, but somewhat different from the preceding 
section, which addressed the fact that different tribunals apply 
different law in different contexts, is the issue that each of the 
tribunals has interpreted its constitutive document as having 
dictated the methodology for interpretation and application of 
law to the alleged crimes. There are several models in the ad 
                                                 
158. See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1534, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004). 
159. For example, the Lebanon Tribunal was created in 2007 to prosecute those 
responsible for the 2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri and twenty-two others. See Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/
lebanon/tribunal/timeline.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).  
160. See Dickinson, supra note 9. 
161. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, 
Judgement (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber Mar. 2, 2009) (embracing 
JCE in all forms). 
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hoc and permanent tribunals. These have been alluded to 
earlier, but deserve a more complete consideration since they 
are key to the particular issue of forms of participation. First, the 
ICTY and the ICTR are charged by their founding documents 
with applying the stated crimes consistently with customary 
international law.162 The report of the Secretary-General on the 
establishment of the ICTY clearly intends that the statute of new 
court be viewed as having codified existing CIL and thus as 
answering any nullum crimen sine lege concerns.163 Interpreting 
the crimes set out in the Statute with a reference to CIL is 
certainly consistent with that concern and leads directly to the 
Tadić decision’s embrace of JCE as established by post-World 
War II CIL. 
Similarly, the hybrid courts have embraced methodologies 
that ultimately have led them to the application of CIL and the 
acceptance of at least some forms of JCE. This is true whether 
the courts are charged with application of domestic and 
international law in the form of CIL, e.g., ECCC in Cambodia; 
application of domestic and defined international crimes 
modeled on the ICTY/ICTR Statutes, which are then 
interpreted under CIL, e.g., Sierra Leone, East Timor; or 
application of domestic law, which is found to allow or require 
the application of international law, including CIL,  as a part of 
domestic law, e.g., Lebanon). 
Finally there is the methodology of interpretation set out in 
the Rome Statute of the ICC. Article 21 of that Statute provides 
that: 
The Court shall apply: 
                                                 
162. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (charging the Tribunal with “prosecut[ing] 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law”); ICTR 
Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (charging the Tribunals with “[p]rosecut[ing] . . . Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law”). 
163 . Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 50 (“[International 
humanitarian law] exists in the form of both conventional and customary law. While 
there is international customary law which is not laid down in conventions, some of the 
major conventional humanitarian law has become part of customary international 
law . . . . In the view of the Secretary General, the application of the principle nullem 
crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal shall apply rules of international 
humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the 
problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does not 
arise.”). 
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(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable 
treaties and the principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of the international law 
of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the 
Court from national laws of legal systems of the world, 
including, as appropriate, the national laws of states that 
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, 
provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this 
Statute and with international law and international norms 
and standards.164 
IV. A PATHWAY TOWARD A COHERENT FRAMEWORK 
A. The Merits Decision in Lubanga165 
The judgment in the Lubanga case essentially affirms the 
PTC’s Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, discussed 
above, with what the Separate Opinion refers to as “minor 
modifications to ensure compliance with the Statute.”166 Those 
modifications do suggest a movement away from the most severe 
aspects of the “control theory” of co-perpetration, but it is the 
Separate Opinion by Judge Adrian Fulford which is the most 
promising in terms of a possible new approach to modes of 
liability in the ICC. 
Judge Fulford of the United Kingdom agreed that the 
control theory of co-perpetration, as modified by the Court’s 
opinion is the test that should be applied to this case “as a 
matter of fairness,”167 since this test represents the principles of 
law on which the trial was prosecuted and defended. However, 
he made his view quite clear at the outset of his opinion “that 
the test laid down by the Pre-Trial Chamber is unsupported by 
                                                 
164. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21. 
165. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgement (March 
14, 2012). 
166. Id. (separate opinion of Judge Fulford); see Thomas Lieflander, The Lubanga 
Judgment of the ICC: More than Just the First Step?, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 191 
(discussing how the Trial Chamber modifies the mens rea requirement of the PTC). 
167.  Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, para. 2 (separate opinion of Judge 
Fulford). 
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the text of the Statute and it imposes an unnecessary and unfair 
burden on the prosecution.”168 The Separate Opinion reviewed 
the PTC’s holding that under Article 25(3)(a), “liability for 
committing a crime ‘jointly with another’ attaches only to 
individuals who can be said to have control over the crime.” 169 
The PTC’s five part test for establishing such co-perpetrator 
liability is “directed at those who have ‘control over the 
commission of the offence.’” The five elements as summarized 
by Judge Fulford are: 
i. The “existence of an agreement or common plan between 
two or more persons; 
ii. The “coordinated essential contribution made by each 
co-perpetrator resulting in the realisation of the objective 
elements of the crime;” 
iii. “[T]he suspect [must] fulfill the subjective elements of 
the crime with which he or she is charged”; 
iv. “[T]he suspect and the other co-perpetrators (a) must all 
be mutually aware of the risk that implementing their 
common plan may result in the realisation of the objective 
elements of the crime, and (b) must all mutually accept 
such a result by reconciling themselves with it or consenting 
to it;” and 
v. “[T]he suspect [must be aware] of the factual 
circumstances enabling him or her to jointly control the 
crime.”170 
1. Distinguishing Between Principals and Accessories 
Judge Fulford addressed the reasons provided by the PTC 
for adopting the control of the crime approach and found them 
both wanting and unsupported by the text of the Statute. First, 
the PTC founded its adoption of the control theory on the 
“perceived necessity to establish a clear dividing line between 
the various forms of liability under Article 25(3)(a)-(d) of the 
Statute and, in particular, to distinguish between the liability of 
‘accessories’ under Article 25(3)(b) and that of ‘principals’ 
                                                 
168. Id. para. 3. 
169. Id. para. 4 (citing PTC decision, paras. 326–38). 
170. Id. 
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under Article 25(3)(a).”171 In response, he argued that the plain 
text of Article 25(3) “defeats the argument that subsections (a)-
(d) . . . must be interpreted so as to avoid creating an overlap 
between them.”172 In his view, the various provisions of Articles 
25(3)(a) (committing a crime through another), and 25(3)(b) 
(ordering, soliciting and inducing the commission of a crime), 
“will often be indistinguishable in their application vis-à-vis a 
particular situation.” 173  He thus concluded that, “in [his] 
judgment the plain language of Article 25(3) demonstrates that 
the possible modes of commission under Article 25(3)(a)-(d) of 
the Statute were not intended to be mutually exclusive.”174 In 
support of this view he noted that “the ad hoc tribunals have held 
that the various modes of liability available under their statutes 
are not mutually exclusive.”175 
The Separate Opinion also rejected the notion of 
distinguishing the various forms of liability by establishing a 
“hierarchy of seriousness that is dependent on creating rigorous 
distinctions between the modes of liability within Article 
25(3).” 176  While Judge Fulford acknowledged that such a 
ranking might be useful if sentencing was strictly determined by 
the particular statutory provision on which defendant’s 
conviction is based, he noted that such is not the case. The 
Rome Statute provisions governing how sentences are to be 
imposed (Article 78 and Rule 145 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence) require reference to “all the relevant factors, . . . 
including the gravity of the crime and the individual 
circumstances of the convicted persons.”177 Although “degree of 
participation” is one of the factors to be considered, “these 
provisions overall do not narrowly determine the sentencing 
range by reference to the mode of liability under which the 
accused is convicted, and instead this is simply one of a number 
of relevant factors.”178 
                                                 
171. Id. para. 6. 
172. Id. para. 7. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. para. 8 n.13 (citing both ICTY and ICTR cases in support). 
176. Id. para. 9. 
177. Id. (citing Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 78(1)). 
178. Id. 
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Judge Fulford noted the source of the “control theory” of 
co-perpetration, as considered earlier in this Article, 
characterizing it as an “approach . . . imported directly from the 
German legal system.” 179  While acknowledging that “Article 
21(1)(c) of the Statute permits the Court to draw upon ‘general 
principles of law’ derived from national legal systems,” he 
argued that before doing so, “a Chamber should undertake a 
careful assessment as to whether the policy considerations 
underlying the domestic legal doctrine are applicable at this 
Court, and it should investigate the doctrine’s compatibility with 
the Rome Statute framework.”180 
The PTC here was apparently led astray by its failure to 
consider these matters. In adopting the German doctrine, the 
PTC failed to take notice of the fact that under the German 
legal system a defendant’s sentencing range is determined by 
reference to the mode of liability under which he is convicted. 
Therefore, precise distinctions between these various modes 
take on heightened importance. In the ICC, however, such 
considerations are inapplicable. 
2. Establishing Principal Liability for Those Who Participate 
Remotely 
Judge Fulford also rejected this second justification for 
adopting the “control theory,” because “a plain reading of 
Article 25(3)(a) establishes the criminal liability of co-
perpetrators who contribute to the commission of the crime 
notwithstanding their absence from the scene, and it is 
unnecessary to invoke the control of the crime theory in order 
to secure this result.”181 
In reaching this result, the opinion cited the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1), which 
provides that a treaty’s provisions (here those of the Rome 
                                                 
179. Id. para. 10. He does, however, devote some time to detailing the ways in 
which the Pre-Trial Chamber’s embrace of the control theory differs from the theory as 
described by Professor Roxin. Id. 
180. Id. (“This applies regardless of whether the domestic and the ICC provisions 
mirror each other in their formulation. It would be dangerous to apply a national 
statutory interpretation simply because of similarities of language, given the overall 
context is likely to be significantly different.”). 
181. Id. para. 12.  
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Statute) are to be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with 
the[ir] ordinary meaning [ . . .] in their context and in light of 
[the Statute’s] object and purpose.”182 In applying this language, 
it concludes that the plain meaning “establishes the following 
elements for co-perpetration”: 
a. The involvement of at least two individuals. 
b. Coordination between those who commit the offence, 
which may take the form of an agreement, common plan or 
joint understanding, express or implied to commit a crime 
or to undertake action that in the ordinary course of events, 
will lead to the commission of the crime. 
c. A contribution to the crime, which may be direct or 
indirect, provided either way there is a causal link between 
the individual’s contribution and the crime. 
d. Intent and knowledge, as defined in Article 30 of the 
Statute, or as “otherwise provided” elsewhere in the Court’s 
legal framework”183 
What the “plain text” of the Statute does not require, in the 
view of Judge Fulford, is whether the requirement of awareness 
by the accused “that a crime will be committed ‘in the ordinary 
course of events’ is to be equated with a ‘possibility’, a 
‘probability’, a ‘risk’ or a ‘danger’ (see paragraph 1012 of the 
Judgment).”184 Also, he noted that the Statute’s requirement 
that the accused “commits” the crime requires “a contribution 
to the commission of the crime.”185 However, “[n]othing in the 
Statute requires that the contribution must involve direct, 
physical participation at the execution stage of the crime, and, 
instead, an absent perpetrator may be involved.”186 In any event, 
“the word ‘commits’ simply requires an operative link between 
the individual’s contribution and the commission of the crime.” 
Finally, a plain reading of Article 25(3) “does not require proof 
that the crime would not have been committed absent the 
accused’s involvement (viz that his role was essential).”187 
                                                 
182. Id. para. 13 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 18232) (alteration in original). 
183. Id. para. 16. 
184. Id. para. 15. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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B. The Pathway Forward 
1. Building on Judge Fulford’s Opinion 
While much of what Judge Fulford says is certainly correct, 
his ultimate conclusion that the “plain meaning” of Article 25 
(3)(a) provides a clear test is not. He is correct in noting that 
“the test laid down by the Pre-Trial Chamber is unsupported by 
the text of the Statute.”188 Nothing in the text of that section, 
nor in the traveaux preparatoires, supports the control theory of 
co-perpetration set out by the majority, with its requirement of 
“essential contribution” and its consequent “hypothetical 
investigation as to how events might have unfolded without the 
accused’s involvement.”189 Nor, as Judge Fulford amply explains, 
does that language require each of the possible modes of 
participation to be mutually exclusive. 
The text of Article 25(3) does not provide a clear test for 
determining individual responsibility for collective crimes. 
Although it represents a carefully negotiated compromise, that 
compromise (as compromises often do) obscures the detail 
necessary for a realistically applicable test.190 I do not agree with 
those who, prior to the Lubanga decision191 or following that 
decision,192 would find in Article 25(3)(a)–(d) a hierarchy of 
culpability. Rather, I agree with Judge Fulford that the self-
evident overlap of several parts of Article 25(3) suggests that 
there was no intention by the drafters to establish such a 
                                                 
188. Id. para. 3 
189. Id. para. 17 (“It seems to me to be important to stress that an ex post facto 
assessment as to whether an individual made an essential contribution to war crimes, 
crimes against humanity or genocide will often be unrealistic and artificial. These 
crimes frequently involve a large number of perpetrators, including those who have 
controlling roles. It will largely be a matter of guesswork as to the real consequence for 
the particular crime if the accused is (hypothetically) removed from the equation, and 
most particularly it will not be easy to determine whether the offence would have been 
committed in any event.”). 
190 . See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Lubanga Decision Roundtable: More on Co-
Perpetration, OPINIO JURIS, http://www.http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/16/lubanga-
decision-roundtable-more-on-co-perpetration/ (“At the outset it should be noted that 
Article 25(3)(a) is maddeningly vague.”). 
191. See, e.g., Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC 
Statute, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 953, 957 (2007) (“Article 25(3)(a)-(d) establishes a value 
oriented hierarchy of participation in a crime under international law.”). 
192. See e.g., Heller, supra note 190. 
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hierarchy.193 Nor should we ignore the heinous nature of crimes 
(and the consequent high degree of culpability for those acting 
in concert in pursuit of a common plan (as envisioned by 
25(3)(d))).194 
2. Constraints of Interpretation 
The way out of this confusing legal landscape lies in the 
rules of interpretation set out in Article 21 of the Rome Statute, 
introduced earlier in this article. 195  All of the opinions in 
Lubanga, Pre-Trial Chamber and Trial Chamber, purport to rely 
upon the first rule of interpretation in Article 21(a) requiring 
that the Court shall apply “this Statute, Elements of Crimes, and 
its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” In the Decision on the 
Merits, both the majority and Judge Fulford’s Separate Opinion 
read the “plain meaning” of this text as definitive and yet, their 
readings are diametrically opposed.196 Judge Fulford’s unease 
with the majority opinion is clearly warranted, but his proposed 
solution is not. 
Instead, because of the inherent ambiguity of Article 21(a), 
the Court should rely upon the second part of Article 21, which 
directs the Court to apply “[i]n the second place, where 
appropriate applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law, including the established principles of the 
international law of armed conflict.” 197  Those “established 
principles” arguably include forms of participation as applied in 
international, hybrid, and domestic courts since World War II. 
Reference should be made to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
                                                 
193.  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, para. 8 (separate 
opinion of Judge Fulford) (March 14, 2012) (“[T]here is no proper basis for 
concluding that ordering, soliciting or inducing a crime (Article 25(3)(b)) is a less 
serious form of commission than committing it ‘through another person’ (Article 
25(3)(a)), and these two concepts self-evidently overlap.”). 
194. I also think that Professor Heller is incorrect in concluding that “Article 
25(3)(d) is limited to contributions to a group crime that are made by individuals who 
are not members of the group.” Heller, supra note 190. This is certainly not self-evident 
from the language of the text, nor from contemporaneous interpretations of its 
drafting and is at minimum contradicted by the ICTY’s reliance on this very language 
in Tadić to find principal liability for one who was a member of the group. 
195. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
196. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, para. 7 (separate opinion of Judge 
Fulford). 
197. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(b). 
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tribunals (ICTY, ICTR, and the various hybrid tribunals 
discussed earlier) and consideration given to the widespread 
acceptance in those courts of the concept of JCE, at least in its 
basic and systemic forms (JCE I and II). The ICC is the outlier 
here in terms of defining individual responsibility in the context 
of a mass crime. 
The current approach by the ICC is problematic on two 
levels, as a matter of procedure and on the substance of the 
question. First, as stated above, the Court seems to have ignored 
the Article 21 methodology of interpretation in failing under 
21(b) to consider “principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of the international law of 
armed conflict.”198 While it might be argued that the latter 
phrase refers to the substantive law defining crimes under 
international humanitarian law, nothing in the language of 
Article 21(b) so limits it. Moreover, previous tribunals 
considering this issue have found that customary international 
law of armed conflict includes determinations of proper modes 
of responsibility.199 Application of 21(b) would have at least 
required the ICC to struggle with whether customary 
international law requires application of joint criminal 
enterprise in some form, and to explain why it was rejecting that 
framework. 
If the Court had found that “applicable treaties and the 
principles of international law” did not provide a framework for 
individual liability for collective crimes, then the 21(c) provision 
directs the Court to apply “general principles from national laws 
of legal systems of the world.”200 One would expect that such an 
application might have considered both civil and common law 
doctrines concerning individual responsibility for crimes with 
multiple perpetrators. So not only the principally German 
“control theory,” but conspiracy and other common plan or 
purpose liability as reflected in the national laws of other civil 
law and common law systems would have been taken into 
consideration. No such exploration takes place in these cases, 
where the Chambers settle upon a theory, not only limited to 
one such national legal system, but in a form almost wholly 
                                                 
198. Id. 
199. See, e.g., supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text. 
200. Rome Statute, supra note 1.  
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dependent on one scholar’s view. This is a theory not only so 
limited, but also, in some of its details, controversial within that 
one legal system. Thus, a good argument could be made that the 
Chambers erred both procedurally and substantively in their 
adoption of the control theory, in failing to consider customary 
international law and in failing to justify the adoption of that 
theory in the face of alternative, more broadly accepted bases 
for liability. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the ICC has to some extent tied its hands in 
terms of moving toward forms of participation more in line with 
CIL and the decisions of other international courts. In Lubanga, 
the Trial Chamber feels itself bound to accept the “control 
theory” basis for co-perpetration, because that is the “law of the 
case” under which Lubanga was charged and prosecuted. Even 
Judge Fulford, who would have the court reject the control 
theory, accepts that the Trial Chamber should apply this 
standard to the case before it because of the accused’s right to 
be informed “in detail of the nature, cause and content of the 
charge[s]” 201  against him. This, Judge Fulford concludes, 
requires that the accused “needs to be aware of the basic outline 
of the legal framework against which [the] facts will be 
determined. This ensures that the accused knows at all stages of 
the proceeding, what he is expected to meet.”202 Because the 
test he proposes using would have made it easier to convict 
Lubanga, the control of the crime theory should, he asserts, be 
applied. Progress toward a coherent concept of individual 
responsibility that encompasses the modes of participation 
discussed in this article, will require the Appeals Chamber to 
reconsider this position. It is clear it must do so. 
                                                 
201. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, para. 20 (separate opinion of Judge 
Fulford). 
202. Id. 
